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P o s i t i o n

Six months after September 11

Assessing EU foreign policy

Center for Applied Policy Research - March 2002


It is now six months that the terrorist attacks on the United States happened, and they had a tremendous influence on international politics. From a European perspective one needs to ask in which way the European Union's foreign and security policy is affected and which features of the Union as an international actor need attention. Of course EU foreign policy is not comparable with US foreign policy and there is no European military power. In this context it is often asked whether Europe matters at all. There are obvious shortcomings on the European side, but at the same time there are specific capabilities the EU can use for a differentiated foreign and security policy approach.

Regional aspects

One of the most prominent regional aspects are the lessons learnt in the Balkans. The success of the recent European Balkan strategy is based on the combination of crisis management and military presence with reconstruction and reform assistance. However, a "Balkan model" or a "stability pact for Afghanistan" might be a fallacy and the transferability of the Balkan strategy is highly doubtful. The promise of a (long-term) perspective of EU accession gives the states and nations of the Balkans a common objective they never had before. It also gives Brussels the leverage needed to push and guide unpopular reform processes and to stimulate economic development and political democratisation in the framework of the stabilisation and association process. Nothing similar is remotely conceivable for Afghanistan.

Moreover, despite the virulence of the ethnic and territorial conflicts in the Balkans, state sovereignty remains the highest goal: Minorities may strive for maximum autonomy or even independence, but state and nation building will be at the core of their program too. It has become common practice to refer to the Balkans as a conglomerate of "weak or failing states," despite the fact that all governments have been democratically elected, have substantial sovereignty over the state's territory and have been accepted as legitimate rulers by most of the population. They only tend to fail in the conceptualisation and implementation of highly ambitious projects of modernisation and integration. Conversely, for at least the past twenty years Afghanistan has not seen any ruler seriously concerned with any sovereignty based on more than military force and control over strategic locations. A civic concept of state and nationhood, integrating different ethnic and religious groups in a state legitimised by its functionality and output, seems utterly unthinkable in the Afghan imbroglio. The key premises of European stabilisation policies for the Balkans are missing in the case of Afghanistan. Whereas the Balkan model may not be transferable, the key lesson learnt in that region over the past ten years, however, may remain valid. Without an equally substantial and determined program of humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction and political stabilisation no military intervention - no matter how massive - can produce long-term stability and security. The political will and stamina of the international community to stimulate and guide processes of stabilisation and sustainable development for years and decades to come will be decisive.

A further region the EU has taken political responsibility for the Middle East and Mediterranean region. There is an urgent need for a strong, coordinated involvement of the main external actors, the US and the EU. They should, in co-ordination with other players, ensure an enduring cease-fire coupled with the perspective of substantial progress towards a long-term settlement. The EU has increased its importance in the international efforts to contain violence and should be prepared to participate in a monitoring force with a clear mandate. As the major donor to the Palestinian Authority, the EU should insist on human rights, good governance and the rule of law.

The September 11 attacks have demonstrated the necessity of the long-term approach of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the region. Yet, the EU will have to become far more involved in the transformation processes of the Southern Mediterranean countries to foster structural change in the region. It should embark on a pragmatic dialogue on terrorism with its partner countries while adopting a higher profile on issues of democracy and human rights. To the countries having signed association agreements the EU should offer to enter into a comprehensive policy dialogue aimed at creating a "Mediterranean tiger" - as a role model of successful development. These "association partnerships" will eventually lead to a type of relationship somewhere between a mere association and a full-fledged EU membership. The EU should seek to strengthen the competitiveness of Southern Mediterranean countries by supporting the design of national specialisation strategies and the development of regional industrial districts and clusters.

The relationship between the EU and the countries of the Gulf region does not reflect the vital links between the two sides. The EU should develop contractual relations with Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries with the aim of integrating them into a future Gulf-wide security system. It should regard its relations with Saudi Arabia and the GCC as a special partnership based on key common interests that should be improved through co-operation in several fields beyond the currently negotiated free trade agreement. As for Iraq, the EU and the US should agree on a common agenda for a "post-Saddam" era, aimed at outlining the conditions for Iraq's reintegration into the international community and support for its reconstruction.

The shaping of a European foreign policy being able to cope with at least some of the demands international politics are confronted with post September 11 will have effects on the EU's relations with Russia and, of course, with the United States. As to relations with Russia, the crucial question remains to what extent the consequences of September 11 will go further toward impulses to strengthen integration and co-operation between East and West than single-issue short-term action. Taking into account all the threats and challenges to Russia's current position, the most important task is to transform tactical co-operation in sustainable partnerships between Russia, Europe and the United States. These partnerships have to be based on widespread numbers of actors and can not be limited to security-related issues. At this very point the problem of belonging to different kinds of societies plays a significant factor, and the alliance can by no means be limited to common security interests. The current situation can be best described as a window of opportunity. If Russia continues its policy of becoming a modern European country, the EU will be facing the challenge of its growing importance. In the fields of modernisation and economic co-operation, the EU is already a strong actor - its role as a security and defence provider still has to be improved. Future developments depend on Russia's strategic choice of further modernisation and the EU's capacity and capability to be a security and defence actor in the international arena.

The EU does not seem to be in the centre of American interest at the moment, unlike those partners that are of geopolitical relevance in the current situation. Those who cannot, are unwilling or too hesitant to offer a strong hand will move to the margins of US perception. This implies for the EU to make greater concrete effort to stabilise the endangered regions of the world. The sharing of burdens and responsibilities is a prerequisite for a transatlantic community that is composed by equal partners. Nevertheless, US foreign policy should seek to clarify to which degree and in which areas the EU is needed as a partner for international burden sharing. Such a choice will largely depend on the way US foreign policy will be conducted, i.e. unilaterally or multilaterally. Much of the success of the transatlantic relationship's quality will depend on whether the foreign policy concepts of the EU and the US turn out to be compatible or whether they are competitive. Assuming that CFSP/ESDP will be developed fast and far-reaching, then US foreign policy will have to realise that a specific model of foreign policy is determining the EU as an international actor that cannot be ignored any longer.

Reform and enlargement

All the aspects mentioned need to be reflected against the background of a far-reaching internal reform process of the European Union that is going to be enlarged in the near future. There were two rival theses after the terrorist attacks of September 11: Some thought that the EU might be forced to press faster and more intense for integration in order to address the challenges of international terrorism. Others, however, expected the process of integration to slow down or even that the community method would step back behind intergovernmental processes of coordination. September 11 has contributed a great deal to the most prominent development of EU's Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The major guidelines for integration, however, have been prepared before September 11 and followed consequently over the last few years. From that point of view, September 11 posed an additional impetus for integration in the fields of JHA and reform of the political system of the EU.

In spite of considerations that September 11 and its aftermath might have a negative affect on EU enlargement, the Union's widening process did not lose but rather gained momentum. Although a number of unsettled problems still remains the likelihood of a "big bang" enlargement including up to ten new member states by 2004/2005 has increased. However, as the details of a next round of EU widening become evident, the European Union will have to agree on a coherent and binding post-enlargement strategy, which includes the stipulation of definite dates for subsequent rounds of EU enlargement. The actions adopted by the Union to fight international terrorism affect the conditions under which new members join the EU. The demands on accession countries to adopt a quickly developing "acquis" especially in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) constitutes a major challenge for the candidates' already stretched police and judicial systems. The EU will have to assist in developing institutional capacities and prove practical assistance, both human and financial. Thought should be given to the idea to establish a "European Border Guard" and/or a "European Customs Service" composed of border guards and customs officers from all member states. Finally, the EU requires to improve coherence and co-ordination between its external and internal security concerns, by taking into account the neighbourhood aspects of existing border regimes, visa and immigration policies when designing, implementing and revising common strategies on its direct neighbourhood in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Proposals on legislation in the area of JHA should contain a "neighbourhood impact assessment", which considers the specific exposure of the future new member states.

What lessons for the future of the EU's foreign and security policy?

The EU has realised that security policy will have to follow a comprehensive concept - September 11 has underlined it. A look at the non-military capabilities of EU external relations offers a broad range of instruments and policies available. However, what is still lacking is a strategic vision of the EU's foreign policy. Of course, the main regions of European interest and engagement can be found in the immediate neighbourhood of the enlarging Union. Nevertheless, because of the high degree of global interdependence the EU is facing as a leading economic and trade political power, and in accordance with the objectives laid out for the CFSP, the political, economic and societal stability of regions, no matter how near or far, is an essential interest of the EU. Therefore, the geographic extension of CFSP/ESDP needs to be clarified, which means to define whether the significance of this policy will be mainly concentrated on the enlarged EU's closer neighbourhood or whether it is a policy with a global outreach. This implies asking whether it seems possible to think of Petersberg tasks in distant region, as for example Asia.

Security in a comprehensive understanding implies, furthermore, that CFSP/ESDP cannot be limited to one pillar of the European treaty framework. On the contrary, there is a necessity for an overarching approach - which was further underlined following September 11 when Justice and Home Affairs became a central topic in the security debate. To close the gap between "common" and "intergovernmental" would thus imply to harmonise conflicting policy fields in favour of a common interest. In the post-Nice reform debate it will be crucial to find a satisfactory model for the decision-making process through which the EU's foreign and security political capabilities can be improved.

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  D o s s i e r

Sechs Monate nach dem Terror
Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik nach dem 11. September

 
           
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