P o s i t i o n
EU Enlargement After September 11
Janis A. Emmanouilidis - March 2002
The implications of the terrorist attacks of September 11 on EU enlargement need to be analysed in the perspective of two particular set of questions: (1) How might the fight against international terrorism affect the timing of a next round of EU widening? (2) How will changes to the Union's acquis especially in the field of Justice and Home Affairs affect the conditions under which new members join the EU?
Effects On the Timing
As an immediate reaction to the events of September 11 the European Commission and representatives of the candidate countries stressed the importance of EU enlargement for the sake of security and stability on the continent. The enlargement process and especially the timing of a next round of EU widening should not be negatively affected. The necessity to adequately react to the challenges of international terrorism, should not hamper developments of major European projects such as enlargement. On the contrary, the process should rather gain momentum than come to a halt.
On the other hand, the impact of the terrorist attacks had the potential to slow down enlargement. Considerations were expressed that enlargement efforts might move far down the list of immediate priorities for EU-15 governments. Moreover, worldwide economic recession following September 11 might have the potential to negatively influence public opinion towards major European projects, not at least towards enlargement - especially since during crisis situations people seem more cautious about grand projects. Economic recession might even burden EU accession talks, which were about to enter their final phase. Moreover, due to the undeniable correlation between EU reform and enlargement, a potential slow-down of the so-called post-Nice reform process could have negatively affected EU widening.
It spite of the above considerations, September 11 and its aftermath did not negatively affect the enlargement process. On the contrary, the process did not lose but rather gained momentum. The vast majority of accession countries were able to provisionally close a number of negotiation chapters. The Belgian Presidency in the second half of 2001, although very preoccupied with coordinating the EU's anti-terrorist reactions, was able to fulfil the objectives laid down in the Commission's roadmap, which had been adopted by the Nice European Council in December 2000. Moreover, the Heads of State and Government have reaffirmed their determination to conclude negotiations with a first number of candidate countries by the end of 2002, so that those states can participate in the elections to the European Parliament in 2004 as members. Acknowledging the progress made in the negotiations and agreeing with the 2001 Progress Report of the Commission, the Laeken European Council identified ten countries able to conclude negotiations by the end of 2002. Although a number of unsettled problems still remain (e.g. negotiations on the chapters concerning agriculture and structural policy; the Cyprus question), the likelihood of a 'big bang' enlargement by 2004/2005 including up till 10 new member states has increased. At the same time, the state of preparation of the candidates and the modalities and the complexity of the accession negotiations did not and do not allow an earlier entry of new member states - as some had pledged in favour of after September 11.
One cannot yet assess the impact of the fight against international terrorism on subsequent second or third rounds of enlargement. However, as the details of a next round of EU widening will become evident at the end of 2002 or early 2003 there will be a need to agree on a coherent and binding enlargement strategy. If the Union does not want to risk loosing its capacity as an anchor of democratic stability and economic reform in those countries which will have not entered the Union in a next round of enlargement. The EU must bring those countries closer to its policies and stipulate definite dates of accession in the framework of a post-enlargement-enlargement strategy.
Effects of an Evolving Acquis
In an effort to fight international terrorism the EU has tabled a series of proposals and adopted a number of actions, especially in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. The agreements reached will affect the conditions under which new members join the EU, since demands on accession countries will increase. The adoption of a quickly developing acquis on internal security constitutes a major challenge for the candidates' already stretched police and judicial systems. The accession countries will have to strengthen their border-control efforts, share intelligence and information and increase their state capacity to track the movement of persons. The EU will have to help in developing institutional capacities and prove practical assistance, both human and financial.
The fight against international terrorism requires to improve coherence
and co-ordination between the EU's external and internal security concerns.
To achieve this, the Union should take into account the neighbourhood
aspects of existing border regimes, visa and immigration policies when
designing, implementing and revising common strategies on its direct neighbourhood
in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Proposals on legislation in the area
of Justice and Home Affairs should contain a 'neighbourhood impact assessment'
that considers the specific exposure of the accession countries and/or
future new member states.
In an attempt to strengthen border controls on the enlarged EU's new eastern
borders thought should be given to the idea to establish a European Border
Guard, consisting of border guards from all member states who are specially
trained to serve in joint missions. Countries with an external border
would transfer their control duties to the European Border Guard and share
the burdens of border policing with all member states. Countries without
an external border could contribute to the costs of border policing directly
and/or via the EU budget and get access to sensitive information through
their national officials serving in such a border guard. Such a European
Border Guard needs to be based on the principles of equal partnership
and reciprocity among new and old member states.
Finally, with the fusion of the Single Market and the Schengen zone, there is a rationale to create a European Customs Service composed of customs officers from all member states. Through a joint institution, member states could share the financial burdens (and revenues), exercise a joint control and thus develop mutual confidence.