P o s i t i o n
September 11th and European Balkan Policies
Wim van Meurs - March 2002
After George W. Bush had been declared the winner of the 2000 presidential elections, his first policy statements and decisions failed to allay European misapprehensions dating back to his electoral campaign: The Balkan region seemed far away and of no "national interest" for the new administration. The terror attacks of September 11th raised the question, whether "ground zero" in New York and the new battle fields of the War on Terror are equally far away from the perspective of Brussels or Skopje and Sarajevo.
Did the attacks by Islamic extremists change not only world order as we knew it, but also the strategies for the Balkan imbroglio? Several prominent treads link the September 11th terror attacks to the Balkans and European policies for the Balkans. Some of the linkages are part of broader shift in international politics (which may or may not predate the terror attacks), others relate specifically to the Balkans and European policies for the region. These linkages range from the broader consequences for transatlantic relations with its implications for Balkan policies to the implications for the on-going process of EU Eastern and (eventually) Southeastern enlargement; from the politics and rhetoric in the region itself to lessons learnt in the Balkans for the reconstruction and "transformation" of Afghanistan.
The Transatlantic Dimension of Balkan Policies
The "War on Terror" has marked a geographic reorientation of US foreign policy. Although a tendency of "benign neglect" characterised the Balkan policies of the new Bush administration even prior to September 11th, it has since become common understanding that the Balkans are first and foremost a burden for Europe to shoulder in a new transatlantic division of labour. The nascent European capabilities for military conflict-prevention and diplomatic crisis-management under CFSP and ESDP are thus in high demand.
Already before September 11th, the State Department had indicated that a follow-up mission in Macedonia ought to be a European endeavour, whereas the Pentagon proved unwilling to commit any additional forces to this peace-keeping operation. Currently, the only US soldier serving in Operation Amber Fox is a press officer, although American logistical and intelligence support is still crucial for the operation. Typically, in a first reaction on the dramatic events in New York and Washington, EU commissioner Chris Patten proclaimed to the "hour of Europe", foreseeing both a strong impulse for European integration in security and foreign policy process as well as increased responsibilities within Europe and beyond.
Despite the upheaval the Macedonia mission caused in German politics, the real challenge and focus for European foreign and security policy is currently the peace-keeping in Afghanistan and the continuing fight against terrorism worldwide. Originally, the envisaged (maximum) operational scenario for ESDP was much like the limited post-conflict management of the Macedonian type and the Balkans seemed the only European region where such an operation could be mounted. Even before the European Rapid Reaction Force has become fully operational, reality has already moved on… Conversely, short of a major new conflagration in the region, a US re-engagement in the Balkans is not to be expected. Rather, the gradual exit strategy predating September 11th will be implemented.
A Wider Europe and (South)eastern Enlargement of the EU
The terror acts committed by Islamic extremists and the subsequent campaign to uproot the worldwide Al Qaeda network of terrorists has reinvigorated the idea of a "Clash of Civilisations." Consequently, the debate on Muslim states (and state-like entities) in Europe and their inclusion in a future enlarged European Union has acquired a new dimension. This debate concerns not only Turkey, the thirteenth candidate for EU membership since the 1999 Helsinki European Council, but also the Western Balkans and their status of potential candidacy for EU membership. Thus, September 11th may have long-term consequences for the concept of Europe and its identity as either an open union or a Western bulwark. Apart from the question of the territorial limits of a European finalité, the threat of destabilisation also redefines the trade-off between speed and quality, between stability and conditionality in the parallel processes of EU and NATO enlargement.
Prior to the Kosovo War, no analyst would have given Romania and Bulgaria a ghost of a chance to open negotiations on EU accession. Yet, the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 opened negotiations with six more countries and offered Turkey the formal status of EU candidate. Similarly, the War on Terror may have a distinct impact on the parallel processes of NATO and EU enlargement. Prior to September 11th, Slovakia and Slovenia (maybe Lithuania) was the best guess for the next round of NATO enlargement to be decided in Prague in late 2002. By now many consider a 19+7 scenario (including Romania and Bulgaria) a forgone conclusion. Conversely, (although for more complex reasons beyond the scope of this paper) the European Union is preparing the ground for a "big bang" scenario, including all ten East European accession states except Romania and Bulgaria. This scenario would reinstate the classical "Balkans" (in contrast to the "Western Balkans" as a 1998 neologism in EU-speak) as a European region of potential and real instability, even though Romania and Bulgaria would still be EU candidates after a 2004 round of enlargement, whereas the five other countries would have to be content with "an EU perspective."
At the same time, the international community and its regional partners have been alerted to the risks of terrorism in the Balkans and will increase their efforts to combat both the actual terrorists and the structural root causes (weak states, corruption and organised crime). Such shifting policy priorities will become noticeable in international frameworks and strategies for the region.Thus, the regional envoy of the Stability Pact, Mihai Razvan Ungureanu, envisaged that September 11th will enhance the importance of Table III (Security) initiatives, e.g. combating organised crime, corruption and human trafficking as they are connected with international terrorism. It remains tobe seen whether or not this will be to the detriment of other Stability Pact initiatives, e.g. Table I (democratisation and civil society). This adds a distinct European interest to the emerging "Wider-Europe policy", identifying the European Union as guarantor of stability in Europe as a whole including not only the member and accession states, but also its neighbours to the East and Southeast: Thus, Justice and Home Affairs would be a key policy area in a possible strategy of differentiated EU integration for Southeastern Europe. In the long run, an island of instability and a safe haven for terrorists within a continental pax europeana is not acceptable.
Taliban Connections in the Balkans
Since Islamic terrorism has become a pivotal issue in the media worldwide, before long reports and allegations concerning connections between Islamic "regimes" in the Balkans and the Taliban or the Al Qaeda network of Bin Laden began to appear in the local and the world press.Whereas the Slavic-Macedonian press claimed to haveidentified connections between the Mujahedin, their allies and the Albanian rebels in the hills around Tetovo, more substantial reports appeared in the Western press highlighting the role of Taliban fundamentalists in the Bosnian War of 1991-1995 and their continued presence in the Bosnia-Herzegovina. Predictably, in The Hague Slobodan Milosevic began using his limited speaking time in court claim he had been fighting a war against terrorism "avant la letter" in the 1990s along the lines of Putin's claims for past Russian actions in Chechnya.
In itself these assertions are neither new nor implausible: Even before the attack on the World Trade Center, according to US intelligence sources Al-Qaeda cells had been "identified in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Sudan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, the United Kingdom, Canada and allegedly inside the United States." Apart from the Islam factor, fragile states structures, extensive possibilities for criminal activities and insufficient border controls constitute competitive advantages of the Balkans for terrorists looking for a foothold in Europe.Key terrorists lived and trained in Germany and the USA unhindered for years.
Therefore, too much excitement over Bosnia as a "Trojan horse" in Western security seems inappropriate, but with the current frenzy of security measures in the USA and Europe, the Western Balkans may gain additional importance for terrorist networks in Europe. Paradoxically, the most effective countermeasure may well be a consistent and intensive continuation of the current peace-building process. Yet, the international community and the neighbouring European Union in particular will face the challenge to improve security and surveillance in this unstable region too. In this context, the US action of arm-twisting of the Bosnian authorities to hand over several Al Qaeda suspects in January to Guantanamo Bay without much concern for legal procedure or civil rights infuriated human-rights groups and is bound to preoccupy the European forces taking over police duties in Bosnia next year.
Nevertheless, former foreign "mercenaries" who decided to settle in Bosnia after the Dayton Agreement are more relevant for the region than highly educated "sleepers" matching the FBI profile of the September 11th terrorists. For the time being, moreover, the media hype on real or alleged connections between local Muslim groups and Islamic fundamentalism seems more relevant than their actual numbers and intentions. True or false, these reports are used in regional and domestic politicking, but most of all to influence the international choice of policy options for the region by instrumentalising the catchword "terrorism." The accusation of "terrorism" thus acquires a new urgency and quality within the region and most of all in its competition for international preference and allegiance.
Similarly, in tension-ridden Macedonia, hard-line Slavs have consistently equated Albanians and terrorists, speculating about possible links between the Albanian groups and the Taliban or even Al Qaeda. For the time being, however, Western conflict management seems to worry about the provocations and obstructionism of Slavic hard-liners rather than about external support for the Albanian rebels of the UÇK or ANŠ. A nationalist outcry in Macedonia, portraying the Albanian rebels as "the European face of Osama bin Laden" blocked the constitutional reforms promised in the Ohrid Agreements for weeks on end. All the more so as most Macedonian Albanians are rather secular Muslims, these allegations were too obvious a ploy to sway Western resolve to implement the agreement and consolidate Macedonia as a multiethnic state., to use Western reactions to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as a bargaining chip in the power politics of the Balkan imbroglio.
The argument by Belgrade and Skopje that they stand for law and order, constituting bulwarks of stability and state sovereignty may touch a nerve in Western capitals in the near future. All the more so, as their opponents in Pristina or Tetovo can easily be portrayed as rebels, extremists and terrorists. Apart from a certain ambiguity in dealing with Muslim states in Europe, another obvious reflex might be a preference for stronger, well-functioning states in the region, adding to the already existing reluctance to see new, fragile states in a further downward spiral of regional fragmentation and destabilisation - a breeding ground for terrorism. Nevertheless, in view of the structural and long-term approach of the European Stabilisation and Association Process for the region, crude attempts to influence presumed preferences for certain countries of nations are not likely to succeed. Local crises like Tetovo or Presevo may temporarily overrule the conditionality of the European "pre-pre-accession" strategy, but neither Albanians nor Serbs can claim a special status as guarantors of regional stability or victims of regional conflicts. The crisis in the Presevo valley drove this point home for the Albanians, the crisis of the Macedonian state contained some clear signs for the neighbouring nations and states.
Lessons Learnt in the Balkans
The first question, however, will be, whether the recent successes of the European Balkan strategy combining crisis management and military presence with reconstruction and reform assistance might serve as a model for a post-Taliban Afghanistan. A "Balkan model" or a "stability pact for Afghanistan," however, might be a fallacy. Quite apart from the fragility of the stabilisation of the Balkans after the demise of the Milosevic regime (demonstrated by the unresolved Tetovo conflict, stopped just short of a civil war), the transferability of the Balkan strategy is highly doubtful. The promise of a (long-term) perspective of EU accession gives the states and nations of the Balkans a common objective they never had before. It also gives Brussels the leverage needed to push and guide unpopular reform processes and to stimulate economic development and political democratisation in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process. Nothing similar is remotely conceivable for Afghanistan: The non-interference of its neighbours so far is largely based on military pressure and ad-hoc coalition-building rather than a common objective or perspective of regional integration.
Moreover, despite the virulence of the ethnic and territorial conflicts in the Balkans, state sovereignty is and remains the highest goal: Minorities may strive for maximum autonomy or even independence, but state and nation building will be at the core of their program too. It has become common practice to refer to the Balkans as a conglomerate of "weak or failing states," despite the fact that all governments have been elected democratically, have substantial sovereignty over the state's territory and have been accepted as legitimate rulers by most of the populace. They only tend to fail in the conceptualisation and implementation of highly ambitious projects of modernisation and integration. Conversely, for at least the past twenty years Afghanistan has not seen any ruler seriously concerned with any sovereignty based on more than military force and control over strategic locations. A civic concept of state and nationhood, integrating different ethnic and religious groups in a state legitimised by its functionality and output, seems utterly unthinkable in the Afghan imbroglio. Openness and the density of civic networks constitute both the strength and the vulnerability of highly developed Western societies, whereas pre-modern regimes with no sustainable policies of economic or infrastructure development or even democratic legitimisation derive their strength from modern military technology, their imperviousness from the possibility to withdraw to the mountains if necessary.
Thus, the key premises of European stabilisation policies for the Balkans are missing in the case of Afghanistan (or, for that matter, other blacklisted "rogue states" in the "axis of evil"). Whereas the Balkan model may not be transferable, the key lesson learnt in that region over the past ten years, however, may remain valid. Without an equally substantial and determined program of humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction and political stabilisation no military intervention - no matter how massive - can produce long-term stability and security. The political will and stamina of the international community to stimulate and guide processes of stabilisation and sustainable development for years and decades on end will be decisive.
Apart from the reorientation of US and European attention, possibly to the detriment of the Balkans in terms of human and financial resources, the aftermath of September 11th also constitutes a challenge for post-conflict stabilisation strategies in general. During the war in Afghanistan, the USA and its European allies agreed on a combination of military might and humanitarian aid. In the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, the diverging American and European philosophies of stabilisation and modernisation as well as the balancing of hard and soft power projection are bound to reappear. In the aftermath of the bombing, the US aversion against peace-keeping missions and comprehensive post-conflict strategies already reappeared.Donald Rumsfeld, for instance, made it clear from the very beginning that "he does not see American troops in a peace-keeping role," while appearing less than enthusiastic about the idea of a stabilization force as such: "At the present time it has not been felt that a stabilization force was necessarily necessary."
These policy preferences are reminiscent of Balkan exit strategies and a division of labour between US warfare and European post-war reconstruction. If the currently dominant trend towards short-lived strategic alliances and exit-strategies persists, European policies for the Balkans - so far based on a regional approach of intensive dialogue and perspectives of stabilisation and integration - may eventually be affected by proxy.