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P o s i t i o n
EU foreign and security policy
post September 11th 2001
Some lessons for the reform debate and for transatlantic relations
Franco
Algieri - February 2002
Has the world changed after September 11th 2001 or not? This question
has become of dominant importance after the terrorist attacks in the United
States, even though it is not explicitly clear what is actually meant
by it. Were international politics easier to understand before that date?
Were security challenges less frightening? Were regional trouble spots
less dangerous for international peace and stability? Should it be argued
that the world has not changed, because it had already been in constant
change ever since the end of the East-West antagonism, but international
politics were not reacting to the new situation?
No matter which explanation will turn out to be the most adequate, one
aspect cannot be denied: the United States is once again demonstrating
its power, which has far reaching repercussions on the recent development
of international relations. From a European perspective, it has to be
asked to what extent the European Union's (EU) foreign policy and security
is affected, whether an impulse has been created to strengthen the EU's
role as an international actor, or whether the Union will play a rather
marginal role.
The EU reacted to the terrorist challenge in a differentiated way and
with specific measures. Apart from the broad agreement to support the
coalition against international terrorism and corresponding statements,
a Plan of Action was adopted by a special European Council on September
21st 2001, comprising diplomatic efforts, police and judicial-cooperation,
humanitarian aid, air transport security, economic and financial measures
and emergency preparedness. But while EU activities were developed, questions
arose concerning the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP), including the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Is
it necessary to re-assess the concept of the CFSP/ESDP? To ask such a
question reflects several aspects:
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First of all, a general scepticism regarding the EU's foreign and
security political capabilities. Examples are numerous and can be
found on the level of the EU member states, on the supranational level
with respect to the role of the institutions involved, on the side
of third countries, in media comments as well as in the academic debate.
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Second, the EU's role as a crisis manager in the Afghanistan conflict
raised doubts about the coherence and strength of European foreign
policy. For example, at the same time that the EU Troika was on a
diplomatic mission in Islamic countries, the British foreign minister
undertook his own initiatives. In the past, such a parallelism of
European diplomacy was often criticised due to its weakening effects
on the perception of the EU as a coherent foreign policy actor. This
time, the argument runs in favour of parallel initiatives, i.e. additional
activities by one or more member states are perceived as strengthening
European foreign policy - based on the assumption, of course, that
a common interest is expressed.
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Third, a further reason for scepticism is related to the results
of the Capabilities Improvement Conference of November 2001. If there
ever was a certain euphoria concerning the military capabilities that
should be made available by EU and non-EU states to achieve the headline
goal , the results of the Capability Improvement Conference speak
in favour of a more sober analysis. There is need for stronger efforts
concerning forces, e.g. protection of forces deployed, commitment
capability and logistics, and concerning strategic capabilities, e.g.
command, control, communications and intelligence resources (C3I).
To remedy these shortcomings, the member states agreed on a European
Capability Action Plan ; nonetheless, one should not expect the existing
problems to be satisfactorily solved in a short period of time. The
recent controversial debate within and amongst EU member states on
the purchase of the A400M military transport aircraft indicates, as
one example, that the EU still has a long way to go before being capable
of handling military operations embracing all levels of the Petersberg
tasks.
The Spanish EU presidency has a comprehensive mandate to further develop
CFSP/ESDP. But to find the necessary agreement between the interests involved
demands time. In order to avoid frustration, it will be important to accept
a longer-term perspective. Could EU forces be able to carry out full Kosovo-type
operations without recourse to US assets by 2015? Would it be possible,
in a period from 2015-2030, to achieve a progressive transfer of national
decision-making, command and control competencies into a common structure,
in which qualified majority voting in some form would be the rule within
a common legal framework?
Apart from accepting the above mentioned time dimension, the EU has realised
that security policy will have to follow a comprehensive concept - September
11th has underlined it. A look at the non-military capabilities of EU
external relations offers a broad range of instruments and policies available.
However, what is still lacking is a strategic vision of the EU's foreign
policy. Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union defines the objectives
of CFSP without reflecting a clear geopolitical thinking. It was stressed
that "the EU has much more scope for preventing and resolving conflicts
on its own continent than elsewhere" . Nevertheless, because of the
high degree of global interdependence the EU is facing as a leading economic
and trade political power, and in accordance with the objectives laid
out in Article 11 TEU, the political, economic and societal stability
of regions, no matter how near or far, is an essential interest of the
EU. Therefore, the geographic extension of CFSP/ESDP needs to be clarified,
which means to define whether the significance of this policy will be
mainly concentrated on the enlarged EU's closer neighbourhood or whether
it is a policy with a global outreach. This implies asking whether it
seems possible to think of Petersberg tasks in distant region, as for
example Asia.
Security in a comprehensive understanding implies, furthermore, that
CFSP/ESDP cannot be limited to one pillar of the European treaty framework.
On the contrary, there is a necessity for an overarching approach - which
was further underlined following September 11th when Justice and Home
Affairs became a central topic in the security debate. To close the gap
between 'common' and 'intergovernmental' would thus imply the harmonisation
of conflicting policy fields for a common interest.
In the post-Nice reform debate it will be crucial to find a satisfactory
model for the decision-making process through which the EU's foreign and
security political capabilities can be improved. Two major tasks exist:
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First, to develop a functioning concept for the interaction between
the different actors and institutions involved, both in a vertical
(between the national and supranational level) and in a horizontal
direction (on the supranational level, e.g. between Council and Commission,
as well as on the national level, e.g. between the member states).
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Second, closely linked with the first task, the decision-taking procedure
has to avoid deadlocks, which brings up the question of an extension
of majority voting and leads, furthermore, to the aspect of differentiated
integration.
A quite popular proposal is to reconsider the relationship and division
of responsibilities between the High Representative for CFSP in the Council
and the Commissioner for External Relations and ultimately merge both
functions, linking it to a vice president of the Commission. It has been
critically remarked that the tension between intergovernmental and Community
competencies cannot be overcome with an actor like the High Representative
for CFSP in the Council Secretariat, because such a structure inevitably
creates more institutional complications. The High Representative, for
his part, defined his role primarily as an actor assisting the presidency
and the member states. Rivalries amongst these two actors do not give
the impression of institutional consistency. "One thing is clear,
that unless a way is found of merging the bureaucracies, the problem of
'institutional' consistency will continue to exist".
In case the decision-making and decision-taking mechanisms will not be
reformed in a sufficient way - due to the well known lack of the political
will of the member states - and CFSP/ESDP remains a 'paper tiger', the
possibility that single member states start to act on their own in specific
crises will be greater, even though an answer by the EU might be called
for. Uncontrolled ad-hoc coalitions and activities outside the agreed
institutional framework would damage the integration process enormously.
Still, it is often difficult to go beyond a conventional understanding
of the European integration process, even though a change of perspective
is of vital importance if the Union's capability to act and its policy-making
process is to be improved - and not to forget, if the acceptance of European
foreign and security policy amongst the EU citizens is to be guaranteed.
The idea to apply enhanced cooperation to CFSP, as outlined in a rather
limited form in the Nice Treaty, could turn out to offer an adequate concept
in order to bring further integration steps and the enlargement of the
Union into line. Assuming that enhanced cooperation can be progressively
developed, this would allow member states willing to deepen cooperation
to further communitarize certain fields of CFSP within a confined setting.
This would represent a sort of learning phase for the future and a redefinition
of integration. The experience gained with EPC has demonstrated that certain
measures were implemented for intensifying political cooperation, then
given a legal basis at a later stage. Enhanced cooperation in CFSP could
produce a similar effect. In practice, it could prove that cooperation
concerning the non-military aspects of foreign and security policy is
possible within a communitarian framework capable of meeting the challenges
of international politics. Furthermore, it would provide an opportunity
to handle the increasing number of particular interests in an enlarged
EU. To sum up, enhanced cooperation in its present form needs to be transformed
into a concept that will lead to a far reaching communitarization of CFSP
for two motives:
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to strengthen and extend the foreign, security and (ultimately) defence
political capabilities of the EU;
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to avoid that ad hoc coalition building, which does not respect the
agreed institutional and legal framework of the EU, becomes the typical
pattern for crisis management.
Transatlantic implications
The European Union cannot be considered a foreign policy actor comparable
to a single state. It would be more than risky to try to compare the United
States' foreign policy, not to mention the military dimension, with the
EU's foreign and security policy. Taking the above mentioned aspects into
consideration, it should therefore be analysed what the United States
can expect from the EU at this stage of CFSP/ESDP's development. The concept
of ESDP neither aims at a European army, nor is the development directed
- at least for the moment - towards a military Union. The specific nature
of the complex decision-making mechanisms, with interwoven actors and
interests on different levels, is characteristic for today's EU, which
is in the midst of an uncompleted foreign and security political reform
process where capabilities improve gradually and not at the same pace
in all policy fields. ESDP is also not conceptualised as a challenge to
NATO and transatlantic relations; rather, it is meant to be a supporting
element. Of course, it needs to be acknowledged that a certain rivalry
between the EU and NATO can become more prominent at the moment when European
states do reconsider the need for two organisations, which - if NATO continues
to turn more and more into a political organisation - follow quite similar
interests. When it has become crystal clear that NATO can never offer
the same quality - not to speak of economic benefits - and deepness of
integration as the EU, when the EU counts more member states than NATO
and when CFSP/ESDP has achieved significant progress, then the role of
NATO will have to be questioned seriously.
US foreign policy should thus seek to clarify to which degree and in
which areas the EU is needed as a partner for international task sharing.
Such a choice will depend largely on the way US foreign policy will be
conducted, i.e. unilaterally or multilaterally. With a view to US foreign
policy after September 11th 2001, some reject unilateralism as an option
and demand cooperative engagement, while others observe that the US "commitment
to multilateral action was tactical rather than strategic". Much
of the success of the transatlantic relationship's quality will depend
upon whether the foreign policy concepts of the EU and the US turn out
to be compatible or whether they are competitive. As the recent state
of the development shows, European security and defence policy is not
too challenging for the United States. Assuming that CFSP/ESDP will be
developed fast and far reaching, then US foreign policy will have to realise
that a specific model of foreign policy is determining the EU as an international
actor that cannot be ignored any longer.
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D
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Sechs Monate nach dem Terror
Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik nach dem 11.
September |