P o s i t i o n

Damage to Transatlantic Relations:
A Look into the Abyss

By Douglas Merrill* - March 31, 2003

There are no inherent limits to the damage that the war in Iraq, or the diplomatic wrangling that preceded it, can do to transatlantic relationships. There is no Soviet menace; there is no competition of systems; there is no likelihood that if the western allies do not hold together, democracy could be extinguished. The alliance between the United States and most of the countries of Europe is, in short, a matter of choice. The bridge between continents is shaky, and it is not clear whether it will hold.

Leading European politicians, most notably French President Jacques Chirac, have questioned the choice in favor of the transatlantic alliance. At Chirac's behest, France led the drive at the United Nations to stymie American and British diplomacy. In the final days before the war, France rejected a proposed resolution from the Security Council more quickly than Iraq did. Chirac's foreign minister was quoted in the March 27 New York Times as being unwilling to say explicitly which side he would prefer to win the war. Chirac, who was re-elected for a five-year term in 2002, has on several occasions said that he believes limiting American power is an important part of France's foreign policy. Given his government's actions in the pre-war diplomacy, it is clear that hindering American goals is a major part of the strategy to limit American power.

To be sure, European politicians have not been unanimous in following this course. The German government has, to an extent, lined up behind it, as has the Belgian. Tony Blair's course in Britain has been the polar opposite, as have that of the Spanish, Portuguese and Polish governments. Other European governments have staked out more ambiguous positions. The transatlantic alliance has survived previous periods of French obstreperousness or non-participation. De Gaulle took France out of NATO's Military Planning Committee, and it has not suffered in effectiveness since then.

But the larger point remains: the transatlantic alliance is no longer an existential matter, no longer a necessity.

In Washington, too, doubts are growing, and not just among high officials of the present government who are not naturally well-disposed toward international organizations. A broad spectrum of American commentators are asking whether a country whose avowed goal is to thwart the United States can be considered an ally, in any meaningful sense of the word. If France speaks for Europe, why should the United States contribute so mightily to European security? If Europe's goal is to limit the United States, why should the US help it do the job?

War, and the prelude to war, have exposed many illusions. Partnerships that had been simply assumed as part of the international system are being looked at anew, with clearer eyes. American policy makers have learned that while Western Europe is unwilling to vote against Libya as president of the UN's Human Rights Commission, Western Europe is more than willing to vote against the United States on a far more serious matter at the UN. Europeans have been reminded that in matters of top priority, the US is willing to act on its own, bypassing the UN.

Perhaps both sides should not have entertained their illusions before the Iraq crisis. In its wake, the evaluation of relations will not be easy, and no one involved should pretend that anything other than a grave breach has taken place. Western Europeans, particularly in France, Germany and Belgium, will no doubt want to think their course all the way through.

What are the likely costs of a consistent policy of opposing the United States? What are the real benefits it might bring? What goals could be achieved in the international realm if, as could be expected, the United States is determined to oppose European initiatives? What would be the costs of building military power to match Europe's rhetorical flights?

If Europe, or, more accurately, France and whoever follows it, chooses to chart an oppositional course, these costs are not likely to remain small.

As both sides evaluate their positions and aspirations for the time during and after the war, it's possible to identify four factors that will determine the depth of damage to transatlantic relations:

• The length of the war

• The war's outcome

• Positive European contributions

• French decisions

More than the war's eventual outcome, its duration will go a long way toward shaping the transatlantic relationship. The longer it goes on, the more opportunities will exist for finger-pointing and blame-sharing. Mini-crises such as Germany's questions about AWACS crews serving in Turkey will arise, and more of them will be likely to cause friction among European and American partners. The longer the war lasts, the longer it will be before American decision-makers think about anything else. A longer war will strengthen the view within the coalition that support from more partners would have helped make it shorter, and confirm the view of non-participants that it was folly in the first place. Recriminations will spiral.

Any ambiguity in the war's outcome will also increase the scope for more damage to the transatlantic partnership. If there is any uncertainty about Hussein's quest for weapons of mass destruction, the critics of American action will see their views confirmed. American decision makers, particularly in this administration, will likely be satisfied with seeing Hussein removed from the world stage and dismiss any other concerns. If the Baath regime is only partly or imperfectly removed from power, complaints from the European side of the Atlantic will likely continue. If Iraq emerges as anything but a near-perfect democracy, elements of Western European opinion are waiting to proclaim American failure.

The positive contributions that European governments make to common security, and to the transatlantic relationship, will also certainly weigh in the balance. German command of international security efforts in Afghanistan are a contribution. The common work against al Qaeda networks is also important. Moves to lower the level of rhetoric would also help. Signs that governments are assessing the relationship soberly, and on its merits, would also be clear signals that they want to limit the damage being done. Having pursued a policy of deliberate confrontation over the last half year, governments in, for example, Paris and Berlin now bear the burden of showing they are serious about working together in the transatlantic partnership.

Finally, the French government has a strategic decision to make. More than any other government in Western Europe, it is free to chart a course in either direction, for or against Washington. Paris will choose whether to pursue national glory, come what may, or whether to work together with the United States and other partners on both sides of the Atlantic. The choice will not be easy, and by all indications the Chirac government's instincts will pull it toward the unilateral course. If it charts this course, the damage to transatlantic relations could be close to irreparable, and the costs for Europe very high indeed.

Governments on both sides of the Atlantic are now looking into the abyss, wondering what happened to the bridge that had been built over fifty years. Key parts are in danger of falling away. Some partners appear to be undermining its foundations. Others are happy to use it, but are not willing to take part in its maintenance. That bridge is no longer a lifeline between democracies facing the challenge of a different social system. Partners on both ends must now choose whether it is worth keeping, maintaining, and perhaps even strengthening.

* Former Senior Research Fellow at the C·A·P